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ABSTRACT
Website fingerprinting enables a local eavesdropper to determine
which websites a user is visiting over an encrypted connection.
State-of-the-art website fingerprinting attacks have been shown
to be effective even against Tor. Recently, lightweight website fin-
gerprinting defenses for Tor have been proposed that substantially
degrade existing attacks: WTF-PAD andWalkie-Talkie. In this work,
we present Deep Fingerprinting (DF), a new website fingerprinting
attack against Tor that leverages a type of deep learning called
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) with a sophisticated ar-
chitecture design, and we evaluate this attack against WTF-PAD
and Walkie-Talkie. The DF attack attains over 98% accuracy on Tor
traffic without defenses, better than all prior attacks, and it is also
the only attack that is effective against WTF-PAD with over 90%
accuracy. Walkie-Talkie remains effective, holding the attack to just
49.7% accuracy. In the more realistic open-world setting, our attack
remains effective, with 0.99 precision and 0.94 recall on undefended
traffic. Against traffic defended with WTF-PAD in this setting, the
attack still can get 0.96 precision and 0.68 recall. These findings
highlight the need for effective defenses that protect against this
new attack and that could be deployed in Tor. .
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1 INTRODUCTION
With more than two million daily users, Tor has emerged as the de
facto tool to anonymously browse the Internet [2]. Tor is, however,
known to be vulnerable to traffic analysis. In particular, website
fingerprinting (WF) is a traffic analysis attack with the potential
ability to break the privacy that Tor aims to provide. WF allows
the attacker to identify web pages in an encrypted connection by
analyzing patterns in network traffic. This allows a local and passive
network adversary, such as a user’s Internet service provider or
someone sniffing the user’s wireless connection, to identify the
websites that the user has visited despite her use of Tor.
WF exploits the fact that differences in website content (e.g.,
different images, scripts, styles) can be inferred from network traf-
fic, even if traffic has been encrypted. From a machine learning
perspective, WF is a classification problem: the adversary trains a
classifier on a set of sites, extracting network traffic features that
are unique to each website. To deploy the attack, the adversary
uses the classifier to match traces of a victim to one of those sites.
The effectiveness of WF depends heavily on both the classifier al-
gorithm and the set of features used. Previous WF attacks use a
set of hand-crafted features to represent Tor traffic, achieving 90%+
accuracy against Tor using classifiers such as Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM) [27], k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) [38], and random
forests [14].
In response to these attacks, a number of defenses have been
proposed. WF defenses add dummy packets into the traffic and add
delays to real packets, aiming to hide features exploited by WF at-
tacks such as traffic bursts and packet lengths. Notably, Tor Project
developers have shown an interest in deploying adaptive padding
as a possible defense [29, 30]. Based on this, Juarez et al. proposed
WTF-PAD and showed that it effectively defends against WF at-
tacks with reasonable overheads, such that it would be practical for
deployment in Tor [20]. Recently, Wang and Goldberg proposed
another effective and low-overhead defense called Walkie-Talkie
(W-T) [41]. These proposals raise the question of whether attacks
could be improved to undermine the effectiveness of the new de-
fenses, a question we address in this work.
While the state-of-the-art attacks use classifiers that are popular
in many applications, deep learning (DL) has shown to outper-
form traditional machine learning techniques in many domains,
such as speech recognition, visual object recognition, and object
detection [23]. Furthermore, DL does not require selecting and
fine-tuning features by hand [31]. In this work, we thus explore
whether we can leverage deep learning to improve classification
results against defended Tor traffic. The key contributions of our
work are as follows:
• We propose Deep Fingerprinting (DF), a new WF attack
based on a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) designed
using cutting-edge DL methods. The attack uses a simple
input format and does not require handcrafting features
for classification. We describe how DF leverages advances
from computer vision research for effective and robust
classification performance.
• To study the attack in detail, we experiment in a closed-
world setting using a new dataset that we collected with
95 sites and 1,000 traces per site. We find that our DF WF
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attack is more accurate against Tor than the state-of-the-
art attacks with 98.3% accuracy. We also show results for
how the number of training epochs and training dataset
size affect the classification accuracy.
• We then show the effectiveness of the DF attack in the
closed-world setting against Tor traffic defendedwithWTF-
PAD and W-T. Against WTF-PAD, the attack reaches 90%
accuracy, which is significantly better than all other attacks.
Against W-T, the attack reaches 49.7% accuracy, which is
better than all other attacks and nearly the theoretical
maximum accuracy [41].
• To investigate in a more realistic setting, we use an open
world with 20,000 unmonitored sites. On non-defended
traffic, the attack achieves 0.99 precision and 0.94 recall.
On traffic defended with WTF-PAD, the attack yields 0.95
precision and 0.70 recall. We also examine the possibilities
for attacking weak implementations of W-T.
• Based on our experimental findings, we propose a number
of new directions to explore in both attack and defense.
Overall, we find that the new DF WF attack undermines at least
one defense that had been considered seriously for deployment in
Tor [29, 30]. We have disclosed our findings to the Tor Project, and
they have expressed their concerns about WTF-PAD, setting the
stage for more exploration of the design of realistic defenses.
2 THREAT MODEL
Among its goals, Tor aims to protect users against local eavesdrop-
pers from learning what sites the user is going to. WF attacks,
however, use traffic analysis to undermine Tor’s protections. Prior
work has shown that, under certain conditions, a local and passive
adversary can identify the pages visited by a Tor user by exploiting
patterns in network traffic [8, 14, 16, 27, 28, 39, 40].
To deploy the attack, the adversary captures the sequence of
packets, also known as a traffic trace, from each of a series of his
own visits to a representative set of websites, including sites he is
interested in detecting. From each trace, he then extracts features
that are unique to each website. In the WF literature, we find a myr-
iad of such features: packet size frequencies [16], total transmission
time and volume in both directions [28], edit-distance score [8, 39],
and the number of traffic bursts in each direction [28, 38], just to
mention a few. As a result, the adversary obtains several feature
vectors for each website that are used to train a supervised classifier
that learns how to identify the site from its features. Finally, the ad-
versary can collect new traffic traces from the user’s connection to
the Tor network, extract the features, and use the trained classifier
to guess the website.
In this work, we assume a network-level adversary that is: local,
meaning that he has access only to the link between the user and
the entry node to the Tor network, and passive, i.e., he can record
network packets but not modify, delay, drop or decrypt them. Po-
tential adversaries that might be in a position to deploy a WF attack
include: eavesdroppers on the user’s local network, local system
administrators, Internet Service Providers (ISP), Autonomous Sys-
tems (AS) between the user and the entry node, and the operators
of the entry node.
Figure 1: The WF threat model
Figure 1 depicts the attack scenario: the client surfs the Web over
the Tor anonymity system and the attacker intercepts the traffic
between the client and the Tor network. We assume the adversary
knows the client’s identity and only aims at identifying the website.
Note that the adversary can trivially obtain the client’s IP address
as long as he has access to the TLS connection between the user
and the entry node. Beyond the entry node, Tor has stripped a layer
of encryption and the IP of the client is no longer present in the
headers of network packets.
Within this scenario, we draw on prior work to make several
assumptions about the attacker goals and capabilities.
Closed- vs Open-world Scenario: A closed-word assumes the user
can only visit a small set of sites and that the adversary has samples
to train on all of them [10, 16, 17, 35]. This assumption was criti-
cized for being unrealistic [19, 29], as the world of sites that can
be potentially visited is so large that not even the most powerful
adversaries have the resources to collect data and train for every
site. Subsequent studies have considered an open-world scenario, a
more realistic setting in which the adversary can only train on a
small fraction of the sites the user can visit. We use closed-world
experiments for detailed comparison of different algorithms and
parameter settings, and we report the results of open-world exper-
iments for a more realistic evaluation of the attack. In the open
world, we follow the terminology used in prior work: themonitored
set includes sites that the adversary is interested in detecting, while
the unmonitored set are all other sites.
Website vs Webpage Fingerprinting: In an abuse of language, most
authors in the field use “website fingerprinting” to refer to the
fingerprinting of only the home page of those websites. There is
research that has attempted to fingerprint pages that are linked from
the homepage [8], but virtually all studies on website fingerprinting
train and test the attacks on home pages. For comparison with prior
work we make same assumptions in our evaluation.
Traffic Parsing: As pointed out by Juarez et al. [19], the attacker
is assumed to be able to parse all the traffic generated by a web
visit and isolate it from other traffic (e.g., traffic generated by visits
in other tabs, non-HTTP traffic over Tor, and so on). We note that
the adversary is able to do so only if he deploys the attack from an
entry node under his control. In that case, the adversary can select
a domain’s traffic by its Tor circuit ID. Concurrent and subsequent
visits to the same domain would still go through the same circuit.
If the adversary is eavesdropping the link between the client and
the entry, all Tor traffic is multiplexed in the TLS connection to the
entry. However, recent research has developed techniques to parse
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visits from multiplexed TLS traffic [40]. As with prior work, we
assume that such parsing has already been done or is not needed.
3 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we categorize and summarize prior work on WF
attacks and defenses and then give the necessary background on
deep learning to follow the rest of the paper.
3.1 WF Attacks
Herrmann et al. were the first to evaluate WF against Tor [16].
However, they only achieved 3% accuracy in a closed world of 775
sites. The main problem with their approach was their reliance on
packet length frequencies – Tor sends data in fixed-size (512-byte)
packets known as cells – which renders this feature useless for
classification of Tor traffic. In 2011, Panchenko et al. devised new
features and improved the attack to 55% accuracy on Herrmann et
al.’s dataset [28]. Since then, the success rate of WF attacks against
Tor has been incrementally improved, reaching 90% accuracy by
two classifiers using edit-distances [8, 39]. These attacks, however,
imposed high computational costs on the adversary, which makes
them impractical for real-world deployment.
Recently, a new series of WF attacks have been proposed with ad-
vanced feature sets and more sophisticated classifiers that maintain
the accuracy at 90% while reducing the cost of the attack [14, 27, 38].
These attacks have become the state-of-the-art WF attacks and are
used to benchmark other attacks and defenses. We have selected
them in this study to compare against our deep-learning-based DF
attack.
k-NN. Wang et al. [38] proposed the k-NN attack. This approach
consists in applying a k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) classifier, in-
cluding features such as packet ordering, number of incoming and
outgoing cells and numbers of bursts. These features are used in
combination to form a distance metric (e.g., Euclidean distance) to
measure the similarity between different websites. k-NN exhibits
very good performance: in a closed-world setting with 100 sites,
it achieved 91% accuracy, and in an open-world setting with 5,000
sites, it achieved 86% True Positive Rate (TPR) and 0.6% False Posi-
tive Rate (FPR).
CUMUL. Panchenko et al. [27] proposed an attack based on a
Support VectorMachine (SVM) classifier and devised a novel feature
set based on the cumulative sum of packet lengths constructed as
follows: the first coordinate in the feature vector is the length of
the first packet in the traffic trace and the i-th coordinate is the
sum of the value in the (i − 1)-th coordinate plus the length of
the i-th packet, where lengths for incoming packets are negative.
The attack achieved 91% accuracy in a closed-world setting. In the
open-world, they study two different scenarios: multi-class, where
each monitored site is treated as a different class, and two-class,
where the whole set of monitored pages is treated as a single class.
The open world results are 96% TPR and 9.61% FPR for multi-class
and 96% TPR and 1.9% FPR for two-class.
k-FP. Hayes and Danezis [14] proposed the k-fingerprinting attack
(k-FP). k-FP uses a random forest classifier to extract fingerprints
of pages: they train the random forest with traditional features,
but the actual fingerprint is represented by the leafs of the trees in
the random forest. The authors argue this representation is more
effective for WF than the one based on the original features. To
solve the open world problem, they feed these new feature vectors
to a k-NN classifier. They also analyze the importance of their
features and ranked them. The results show that the top 20 most
important features involve counting the number of packets in a
sequence, and that these leak more information about the identity
of a web page than complex features such as packet ordering or
packet inter-arrival time features. k-FP achieved 91% accuracy in a
closed-world setting and 88% TPR and a 0.5% FPR in an open-world
setting.
3.2 WF defenses
The fundamental strategy to defend against WF attacks is to add
dummy packets and/or delay packets. This cover traffic makes WF
features less distinctive, thus increasing the rate of classification
errors committed by the adversary. The first defense that used
this strategy against WF was BuFLO [12], proposed by Dyer et al.,
whose strategy was to modify the traffic to make it look constant
rate and thus remove packet-specific features. However, coarse
features such as total volume, size and time were hard to conceal
without incurring high bandwidth overheads [12]. Tamaraw [6]
and CS-BuFLO [7] tried to solve this problem by grouping sites that
are similar in size and padding all the sites in a group to the greatest
size in that group. Even so, these defenses still require more than
130% extra bandwidth than unprotected Tor and, on average, pages
load between two to four times slower [6, 7, 12].
Recently, two lightweight countermeasures have been proposed
for deployment in Tor for their low latency overhead: WTF-PAD
and Walkie-Talkie.
WTF-PAD. Tor developers have expressed a preference for using
adaptive padding as a WF defense [29, 30]. Adaptive padding [33]
saves bandwidth by adding the padding only upon low usage of
the channel, thus masking traffic bursts and their corresponding
features. Since adaptive padding was originally designed as a de-
fense against end-to-end timing analysis, Juarez et al. proposed
WTF-PAD, a system design for deploying adaptive padding for
WF defense in Tor [20]. WTF-PAD has been shown to be effective
against all state-of-the-art attacks with relatively moderate band-
width overheads compared to the BuFLO-style defenses (e.g. 54%).
Plus, since WTF-PAD does not delay packets, it does not incur any
latency overhead.
Walkie-Talkie. Walkie-Talkie (W-T) has the Tor browser communi-
cate with the web server in half-duplex mode, in which the client
sends a request (such as for an image file) only after the server has
fulfilled all previous requests. As a result, the server and the client
send non-overlapping bursts in alternate directions. Moreover, the
defense also adds dummy packets and delays to create collisions,
in which two or more sites have the same features as used by the
adversary’s classifier. The key idea is that the traces that result from
half-duplex communication can be transformed to create a colli-
sion with less padding than it would with full-duplex traces. W-T
provides strong security guarantees with 31% bandwidth overhead
and 34% latency overhead.
Despite the low cost of these two defenses, their evaluations
have shown that each defense can significantly reduce the accuracy
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of the attacks to less than 30%. As of today, they are the main
candidates to be implemented in Tor. In this paper, we evaluate all
the attacks against them.
3.3 WF Attacks using Deep Learning
Many applications have adopted deep learning (DL) to solve com-
plex problems such as speech recognition, visual object recognition,
and object detection in images [23]. DL does not require selecting
and fine-tuning features by hand. In the WF domain, there are four
works that have begun to examine the use of DL.
Abe and Goto studied the application of Stacked Denoising Au-
toencoders (SDAE) [3] to WF attacks. They showed that SDAE is
effective with 88% accuracy in the closed world and 86% TPR and
2% FPR in the open world. Although most work in deep learning
recommends large data sets be used, their work was successful with
only a small dataset.
Rimmer et al. proposed to apply DL for automated feature extrac-
tion in WF attacks [31]. The results show that the adversary can
use DL to automate the feature engineering process to effectively
create WF classifiers. Thus, it can eliminate the need for feature
design and selection. In the closed-world scenario, their CNN-based
attack (which we refer to as Automated Website Fingerprinting, or
AWF) trained on 2,500 traces per site could achieve 96.3% accuracy.
In their open-world evaluation, SDAE performs the best of their
models with 71.3% TPR and 3.4% FPR when optimizing for low FPR.
However, AWF could not outperform state-of-the-art WF attacks
such as CUMUL.
Recently, Bhat et al. [5] and Oh et al. [26] have released prelimi-
nary reports on their explorations of a CNN variant and unsuper-
vised DNNs with autoencoders, respectively. While both papers
include interesting contributions, neither paper reports accuracy
rates as high as those shown in our results. Additionally, neither
attack was shown to be effective against WTF-PAD.
In this work we aim to bridge this gap by developing a pow-
erful CNN-based deep learning model called deep fingerprinting
(DF) that can substantially outperform all previous state-of-the art
WF attacks. The DF model uses a more sophisticated variant of
CNN than AWF, with more convolutional layers, better protections
against overfitting, hyperparameters that vary with the depth of
each layer, activation functions tailored to our input format, and a
two-layer fully connected classification network. These differences
in the architectural model from AWF, which are described in more
detail in Section 5.3, lead to a deeper and more effective network.
We show that the DF model works significantly better than AWF
and all other attacks, particularly against WF defenses and in the
more realistic open-world setting.
3.4 Deep Learning
In our work, we mainly focus on two deep learning techniques that
previous work has shown to be promising for WF attacks.
3.4.1 StackedDenoising Autoencoders (SDAE). Vincent et al. [37]
proposed SDAEs in 2010 to improve classification performance in
recognizing visual data. SDAE leverages the concept of an autoen-
coder (AE), a simple 3-layer neural network including input, hidden
and output layers. In AE, the input data is first encoded, passing
it through a layer of neurons to a more condensed representation
(the hidden layer). The AE then performs decoding, in which it
attempts to reconstruct the original input from the hidden layer
while minimizing error. The main benefit of AE is to extract high-
level features from the training data, resulting in dimensionality
reduction.
A Denoising Autoencoder (DAE) uses the basic concept of AE
but also adds noise to the input. The DAE tries to reconstruct the
original values from the noisy inputs, which helps it to better gener-
alize and thus handle a wider variety of inputs after training. SDAE
combines ("stacks") multiple DAEs by overlapping a hidden layer as
an input of the next DAE. Vincent et al. showed that SDAE achieves
lower classification error rates for image classification compared
to SVM, Deep Belief Networks (DBN), and Stacked Autoencoders
(SAE) [37].
3.4.2 Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). CNNs have be-
come the gold standard in image classification after Krizhevsky
et al. won the Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC)
in 2012 [22]. Schuster et al. recently proposed applying a CNN on
encrypted video streams, and they show that the encrypted stream
could be uniquely characterized by their burst patterns with high ac-
curacy [32]. This suggests that CNNs could be useful for WF attacks
as well. Figure 2 shows the basic architecture of a CNN [22, 24]. The
architecture consists of two major components: Feature Extraction
and Classification.
In Feature Extraction, the input is first fed into a convolutional
layer, which comprises a set of filters. Each region of input is con-
volved with each filter, essentially by taking the dot product of the
two vectors, to get an intermediate set of values. These values are
input to an activation function – this is similar to neurons being
activated based on whether or not the filtered input has certain
features. Having more filters means being able to extract more fea-
tures from the input. The output of the activation function is then
fed into a pooling layer. The pooling layer progressively reduces the
spatial size of the representation from the feature map to reduce
the number of parameters and amount of computation. The most
common approach used in pooling is Max Pooling, which simply
selects the maximum value in a spatial neighborhood within a par-
ticular region of the feature map to be a representation of the data.
This has the advantage of being invariant to small transformations,
distortions and translations in the input, since the largest signals
in each neighborhood are retained. The final part of the feature
extraction component (Optimized techniques in Figure 2) mainly
consists of a stochastic dropout function and Batch Normalization
that help improve classifier performance and prevent overfitting.
The CNN then passes the output from the convolutional and
pooling layers, which represents high-level features of the input,
into the Classification component. In this component, a set of fully-
connected layers uses the features to classify the input. During
training, the loss value of classification is used to not only update
weights in the classification component but also the filters used
in feature extraction. To estimate the loss value, we use categor-
ical cross-entropy, which is suitable for multi-class classification
problems such as WF.
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Feature Extraction
Fully Connected Layers
Classification
Figure 2: A basic architecture of convolutional neural networks (CNN)
4 DATA COLLECTION
For the closed-world dataset, we visited the homepage of each of the
top Alexa 100 sites 1,250 times and dumped the traffic generated by
each visit separately using tcpdump. We used ten low-end machines
in our university’s campus to collect the data. We have followed
prior work’s methodology for data collection [19, 39]; on each
machine, the visits were sequential and were ordered according
to Wang and Goldberg’s batched methodology to control for long-
and short-term time variance [39]. More specifically, we split the
visits to each site in five chunks, so that the websites are accessed
in a round-robin fashion: in each batch we access each site 25 times.
As a result of batching, the visits to a site are spread over time. The
rationale for this is twofold: i) to avoid having our IP addresses
banned by the web servers; and, ii) to capture variants of the sites
over time for more robust training and testing.
We used tor-browser-crawler [19] to drive the Tor Browser to
visit websites. This allows for more realistic crawls than using tools
like wget or curl because the setting resembles a real user browsing
the Web with Tor. We acknowledge that to be more realistic, our
crawler should model user browsing behavior when crawling sites.
However, modeling user behavior in Tor is challenging, as user
statistics are not collected for privacy reasons. Virtually all existing
datasets collected for WF follow the same simplistic user model we
use in this study.
After the crawls were finished, we discarded corrupted traffic
traces. For instance, we removed traces that did not have any in-
coming or outgoing packets or were too short – less than 50 packets.
After removing corrupted traces, we only kept the sites, or classes,
that had at least 1,000 visits. We ended having 95 sites with 1,000
visits for our closed-world evaluations. We refer to the set of the
data used for closed-world evaluations as the closed-world dataset.
Open-world dataset. For the open-world dataset, we visited the sites
from Alexa’s top 50,000, excluding the first 100 sites used to build
the closed-world dataset. We used the same ten machines to collect
the data, where each machine collected the data for 5,000 different
sites sequentially. We visited each open-world site only once and
took a screenshot of their homepages. After collecting the data,
we discarded corrupted visits the same way we did for the closed-
world dataset. During the crawling of the open-world, we found
sites returning an access denied error message, a timeout error, or
a blank page. Moreover, many of the sites were behind Cloudflare’s
CDN, which presents a CAPTCHA to connections coming from Tor
exit relays. We removed those sites from our dataset by comparing
their homepage’s screenshot with each of: a blank page, an access
Table 1: Hyperparameters selection for DF model from Ex-
tensive Candidates Search method
Hyperparameters Search Range Final
Input Dimension [500 ... 7000] 5000
Optimizer [Adam, Adamax,RMSProp, SGD] Adamax
Learning Rate [0.001 ... 0.01] 0.002
Training Epochs [10 ... 50] 30
Mini-batch Size [16 ... 256] 128
[Filter, Pool, Stride] Sizes [2 ... 16] [8, 8, 4]
Activation Functions [Tanh, ReLU, ELU] ELU, ReLU
Number of Filters
Block 1 [Conv1, Conv2]
Block 2 [Conv3, Conv4]
Block 3 [Conv5, Conv6]
Block 4 [Conv7, Conv8]
[8 ... 64]
[32 ... 128]
[64 ... 256]
[128 ... 512]
[32, 32]
[64, 64]
[128, 128]
[256, 256]
Pooling Layers [Average, Max] Max
Number of FC Layers [1 ... 4] 2
Hidden units (each FCs) [256 ... 2048] [512, 512]
Dropout [Pooling, FC1, FC2] [0.1 .. 0.8] [0.1, 0.7, 0.5]
denied page, a CAPTCHA page, and a timeout error page. The final
dataset has a total of 40,716 traffic traces.
Defended dataset. To evaluate the defenses, we produced datasets
with traces protected by each defense: for BuFLO, Tamaraw and
WTF-PAD, we protect traces by padding them according to the
defense protocols, using the scripts and simulators provided by the
authors [6, 12, 20]. Walkie-Talkie, however, cannot be completely
simulated, as half-duplex communication is hard to model. We
thus performed a new crawl with a Tor Browser in half-duplex
mode. Since the implementation of half-duplex for the original
implementation of Walkie-Talkie was done in an outdated version
of the Tor Browser, we had to implement half-duplex in the latest
version of Tor Browser at the time of our crawls (Tor Browser
Bundle version 7.0.6). With this modified Tor Browser, we collected
closed- and open-world datasets of size similar to the undefended
ones. Walkie-Talkie also requires padding the bursts in the half-
duplex traces. To that end, we followed the mold padding strategy
as described in the Walkie-Talkie paper [41].
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate WF attacks based on SDAE, DF and
AWF. We compare them with the state-of-the-art WF attacks. We
used our datasets for these evaluations.
5
5.1 Implementation
Our implementation of the DF model uses the Python deep learn-
ing libraries Keras as the front-end and Tensorflow as the back-
end [1]. The source code of the implementation and a dataset to
reproduce our results is publicly available at https://github.com/
deep-fingerprinting/df.
5.1.1 Data Representation. In WF, a website trace is represented
as a sequence of tuples <timestamp,±packet_size>, where the sign
of packet_size indicates the direction of the packet: positive means
outgoing and, negative, incoming.
Prior work in WF has shown that the most important features
are derived from the lengths of traces in each direction [14, 38].
Wang et al. [38] simplified the raw traffic traces into a sequence
of values from [−1, +1], where they ignored packet size and times-
tamps and only take the traffic direction of each packet. However,
we performed preliminary evaluations to compare the WF attack
performance between using packet lengths and without packet
lengths, i.e., only packet direction, as feature representations. Our
result showed that using packet lengths does not provide a no-
ticeable improvement in the accuracy of the attack. Therefore, we
follow Wang et al.’s methodology and consider only the direction
of the packets.
SDAE, DF and AWF require the input to have a fixed length. In
order to find the input length that performs best, we parameterized
it and explored the range [500, 7, 000], which contains most of
the length distribution in our data. Our results show that 5,000
cells provide the best results in terms of classification accuracy.
In practice, most of the traces are either longer or shorter than
that. We padded shorter traces by appending zeros to them and
truncated longer traces after 5,000 cells. Out of 95,000 traces in the
closed-world dataset, only 8,121 were longer than 5,000 cells and
had to be truncated, while the rest were padded.
5.1.2 SDAE. We reproduced Abe and Goto’s results [3], as de-
scribed in Section 3. Following guidance from the authors, we suc-
cessfully re-implemented their SDAE neural network on the same
architecture and dataset they used. We achieved 89% accuracy, a
slightly higher accuracy than the one Abe and Goto reported in
their paper. We believe that using different Python DL modules
(Kera and Tensorflow) and randomly initializing the weights ac-
counts for this difference. Furthermore, we slightly changed their
SDAE model’s hyperparameters to improve its performance in our
experiments.
5.1.3 AWF. Rimmer et al. provided us with their source code
to re-produce their results. We strictly followed their proposed
hyperparameters and evaluate the model in our dataset to make a
fair comparison for our model and the previous state-of-the-art WF
attacks.
5.1.4 DF. To develop our DF model to effectively perform WF
attacks on both non-defended and defended dataset, we have fol-
lowed techniques in the deep learning literature [21, 22, 36] to
improve the performance of the model, such as using the appro-
priate number of convolutional layers, mitigation and prevention
of overfitting [34] and a suitable activation function for our WF
input data [25]. These studies helped us design the sophisticate
architecture and tune the model’s hyperparameters that best fit for
WF.
We adapted the base CNN model of DF to our needs, as there
are important differences between traffic analysis and traditional
applications of CNN-based models such as image recognition. For
example, standard activation functions such as sigmoid and rectified
linear unit (ReLU) do not activate on negative values and thus will
not use the information conveyed by the sign of the input (i.e., cell
direction). Activation functions that can handle negative inputs
include tanh, leaky ReLU (LReLU), parametrized ReLU (PReLU)
and Exponential Linear Unit (ELU). Prior work has shown that
ELU provides fast and accurate classification [11, 25]. We compared
ELU with other activation functions during hyperparameter tuning
and it performed the best among all the functions we tested (see
Section 5.2). Although the traditional tanh function can also handle
negative inputs, it is vulnerable to the vanishing gradient issue [4],
which slows down optimization.
Another difference between traffic and image data is that images
are two-dimensional, whereas our data is a vector. This means that
filter and pool sizes cannot be two-dimensional (e.g., 2x4) but have
to be cast to one dimension (e.g., 1x4).
5.2 DF’s Hyperparameter Tuning
A fundamental process in supervised classification is to tune the
hyperparameters of the classification model, such as the kernel
used in an SVM or the number of hidden layers in a CNN. This
process involves adjusting the trade-off between variance, bias and
classification performance, so that the model fits the training data
while still generalizing to samples that it has not been trained on. For
DF, however, the large amount of training data and the large number
of hyperparameters the model has render an exhaustive search
prohibitive in terms of computational resources. To demonstrate
our attacks, we thus only aim at a good-enough classifier and we
acknowledge that someone with more resources might be able to
optimize our model further.
To select the hyperparameters for our models, we perform an
extensive search through the hyperparameter space, in which we
build each layer of the deep learning model block by block. In
each building block, we vary the hyperparameters to estimate the
gradient of the parameter and determine whether we must increase
or decrease its value. Once this process is done, we select the best
top-n parameters and use them as the initial parameters for the
optimization in the next block. When all layers are set, we select
the best combination of hyperparameters.
By the transferability property of neural networks [42], WF at-
tacks based on other models can use the values we found for the DF
hyperparamters to bootstrap the hyperparameters of their model.
We thus used the transferability property to find the parameters
for the defended datasets from the hyperparameters found using
the undefended dataset. We only needed to slightly adjust some
hyperparameters to optimize our model, significantly reducing the
time spent in hyperparameter tuning. We thoroughly illustrate and
explain our design of DF model in Appendix A. The search space
as well as the final selected values are shown in Table 1.
Evaluating overfitting Even though deep neural networks (DNN)
are a powerful supervised classification model, they are, as with as
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Figure 3: Comparison between AWF and DF models
most machine learning models, vulnerable to overfitting. Overfit-
ting occurs when the model errs on samples that it has not been
trained on, meaning that the model cannot generalize. For small
datasets, overfitting can be measured with cross-validation tech-
niques. For large datasets like ours, however, we can just split the
data into three mutually exclusive sets: training, validation and
testing, with a ratio of 8:1:1. We then measure the difference in
error rate between different sets. In case of overfitting, the model
would achieve a substantially higher accuracy on the training set
than on the testing set.
During the training of our DF model, we applied Dropout [34]
and Batch Normalization (BN) [18] to prevent overfitting. These
are regularization techniques that loosen the model and allow for
greater generalization. In dropout, the model randomly selects
hidden units, including their incoming and outgoing connections,
and temporarily removed them from the network while training.
BN normalizes the fully-connected and convolutional layers’ out-
puts and helps accelerate learning while also reducing overfitting.
Moreover, we analyze the error rates between training and testing
datasets during hyperparameter tuning to ensure that our model is
not overfitting.
Figure 4 depicts the training and testing error rates. The differ-
ence between training and testing error of the DF model is less than
2%, suggesting that overfitting is unlikely.
5.3 Differences Between DF and AWF
We now explain the significant differences of the DF model com-
pared to the AWF model proposed by Rimmer et al. [31] that help
explain the superior performance of DF.
Basic Block Design. The basic block is the group of convolutional
layer(s), max pooling layer, filters and activation layer(s) that per-
form feature extraction in a CNN. Generally, the basic block is
repeatedly appended to create deeper networks.
We observe that the AWF model is similar to Imagenet [22], one
of the earliest CNNmodels proposed in 2012. The basic block of this
model only contains one convolutional layer followed by one max
pooling layer as shown in Figure 3(a). In contrast, our DF model
is inspired by modern large image classification networks such
as VGG [21], GoogleNet [36] and ResNet [15] that apply at least
two consecutive convolutional layers before a max pooling layer
as shown in Figure 3(b). Max pooling typically reduces the data to
a smaller size, so it is not possible to have deeper networks when
pooling after every convolutional layer. Adding more convolutional
layers in each basic block thus enables more convolutional layers in
total and a deeper network with more effective feature extraction.
Overfitting Concerns. Rimmer et al. criticized the CNN model for
having a higher risk of overfitting which was shown in their ex-
perimental results. We argue that a more carefully crafted model
can mitigate overfitting. The AWF model includes a dropout layer
before the first basic block as shown in Figure 3(a). While dropout
is a common technique to help prevent overfitting, this placement
is atypical in CNN designs, as it may result in the loss of meaning-
ful features extracted from the input and may not be sufficient to
prevent overfitting. In DF, we used overfitting-contention mech-
anisms that are applied in the state-of-the-art CNN networks for
computer vision, including a batch normalization (BN) layer that
is added right after each convolutional layer and a dropout layer
after the activation function, as explained in Section 5.2. With these
mechanisms, the DF model shows no evidence of overfitting in our
experiments.
Varying Hyperparameters In the AWF model, the value of some
hyperparameters are fixed such as using 32 filters in every convo-
lutional layer. Using a fixed number of filters over all the layers
reduces the capability of the model to learn. In contrast, the DF
model follows the state-of-the-art in computer vision by varying
hyperparameter values for different layers [21]. For example, we
increase the number of filters as we get deeper in the network. The
intuition behind varying the values is that the CNN uses hierarchi-
cal features in its processing pipeline. The features in lower layers
(close to the input) are primitive, like edge detection, while features
in upper layers are high-level abstract features, like object detection,
made from combinations of lower-level features. We increase the
number of filters at higher layers to improve the ability to encode
richer representations.
Activation Function. The AWFmodel only uses the ReLU activation
function. ReLU is popular in CNNs, but it maps all negative values
to zero. Our input formats include negative values that represent
incoming packets, so using ReLU in convolutional layers close the
input can substantially reduce the information available to deeper
layers in the model. In the DF model, the activation function in
the first basic block is ELU, which can learn a data representation
containing negative values to ensure that the model can learn all
meaningful representations from the input.
Fully-connected Layers. The AWF model directly connects the last
max pooling layer to the prediction layer, a densely connected layer
with an output size equal to number of classes. In more recent
CNNs, there are a set of fully connected (FC) layers that follow the
convolutional layers and precede the prediction layer. The FC layers
play an important role in the learning and classification processes
of the model. Essentially, the convolutional layers perform feature
extraction, but that means that it is important to carefully design the
classifier that uses the extracted features, which is the role of the FC
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layer. In the DF model, we add two FC layers with the combination
of BN and dropout to prevent the overfitting that normally occurs
in FC layers.
Overall, our DF model was specifically designed to effectively
perform WF attacks by leveraging the state-of-the-art techniques
from computer vision research. We provide a thorough explanation
on how the DF model was developed and a visualization of the
DF model in Appendix A to allow other researchers to gain better
understanding and reproduce our work. Our experimental results
confirm that DF performs better than AWF model in defended and
non-defended and on both closed-world and more realistic open-
world scenarios. These results help to illustrate the impact of the
DL architecture design on the performance of the attacks.
5.4 Closed-world Evaluation on Non-defended
Dataset
We evaluate the performance of the DF attack in the closed-world
scenario on the non-defended dataset, which comprises website
traces from the closed-world dataset with no WF defenses in place.
Moreover, we compare DF model with the state-of-the-art WF
attacks: k-NN, CUMUL, k-FP, AWF, and SDAE. We re-evaluate
these attacks on our non-defended dataset and apply k-fold cross-
validation for training their classifiers and testing their performance,
as was done in the papers presenting these attacks [14, 27, 38].
Table 2: Closed World: Accuracy on the non-defended
dataset for state-of-the-art attacks.
Classifier SDAE DF AWF k-NN CUMUL k-FP
Accuracy 92.3% 98.3% 94.9% 95.0% 97.3% 95.5%
Table 2 shows the accuracy results. Our DF model attains 98.3%
accuracy, which is better than the other attacks and higher than any
previously reported result for a WF attack in Tor. Our DF model
performs better than AWF. Our results for AWF (94.9%) are a bit
lower than the reported results by Rimmer et al. (96.5%), we believe
this is due to the larger dataset used by them. We observe that
CUMUL, k-FP, k-NN and SDAE benefit from the larger training data
set with 2-4% higher accuracies than previously reported results
that used smaller datasets (usually 90 training instances). SDAE
was not as accurate as the other attacks.
Additionally, we investigate how fast the model can learn to
distinguish patterns from the input data, also known as convergence
of the model. This depends on many factors such as the method
used for data pre-processing, the DL architecture and the hyperpa-
rameters used to create the model. This evaluation helps to validate
the quality of our hyperparameter tuning method. Moreover, the
attacker can use this to estimate the number of training epochs,
rounds of feeding training data into the classifier, required for the
classifier to reach the expected level of accuracy. Normally, the
classifier gradually learns better with more training epochs.
Figure 4 shows that with only 10 training epochs, DF can reach
testing accuracy of about 97%, DF consistently improves with more
training epochs, until accuracy levels off after 30 epochs.
Finally, we investigate the impact of dataset size on classifier ac-
curacy. The results shown in Figure 5 indicate that DF and CUMUL
10 20 30 4090
92
94
96
98
100
Number of epochs
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0
2
4
6
8
10
Er
ro
rR
at
eDF Training Accuracy
DF Testing Accuracy
DF Testing Error Rate
DF Training Error Rate
Figure 4: Closed World: Impact of the number of training
epochs on DF accuracy and error rate
0 200 400 600 80060
70
80
90
100
Training Size
Ac
cu
ra
cy
DF
CUMUL
k-NN
k-FP
AWF
SDAE
Figure 5: ClosedWorld: Impact of numbers of training traces
on classification accuracy
consistently outperform the other attacks for all training sizes. With
just 50 traces per site, both DF and CUMUL achieve 90% accuracy.
k-NN, k-FP and AWF require 250 traces to reach this accuracy, and
SDAE requires 750 traces. The observed accuracies mostly saturate
after 550 traces, except for SDAE. The results show that the var-
ious techniques used in the DF model lead to significantly better
performance compared to the simpler AWF model.
5.5 Training Cost
We now examine the training time for WF attacks using DL in
comparison to state-of-the-art WF attacks. We found that with
GPU acceleration by using NVIDIA GTX 1070 with 8 GB of GPU
Memory, SDAE required 16 minutes for training (13 minutes for
pre-training and 3 minutes for fine-tuning processes), DF required
64 minutes for 30-epoch training. The relatively simpler AWFmodel
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Table 3: Accuracy in a closed-world scenario on defended datasets, SDAE, DF, and AWF vs. the state-of-art WF attacks
Defenses
Overhead Accuracy of WF attacks on defended datasets
Bandwidth Latency SDAE DF AWF k-NN CUMUL k-FP
BuFLO 246% 137% 9.2% 12.6% 11.7% 10.4% 13.5% 13.1%
Tamaraw 328% 242% 11.8% 11.8% 12.9% 9.7% 16.8% 11.0%
WTF-PAD 64% 0% 36.9% 90.7% 60.8% 16.0% 60.3% 69.0%
Walkie-Talkie 31% 34% 23.1% 49.7% 45.8% 20.2% 38.4% 7.0%
requires 4 minutes for 30-epoch training. Without a GPU, SDAE
required 96 minutes, DF required approximately 10 hours, and
AWF required 1 hour. For training the other attacks, we found it
required 12.5 hours for k-NN, 57 hours for CUMUL (parallelized
with 4 processes), and 1 hour for k-FP. Overall, SDAE, DF and AWF
have reasonable training times, particularly when using a GPU.
5.6 Closed-world Evaluation on the Defended
Dataset
We next examine the performance of WF attacks against Tor traf-
fic with defenses in the closed-world scenario. It is important to
note that the attacker needs to train the classifiers with defended
datasets to perform this attack. As mentioned in Section 3, several
WF defenses have been proposed that they can reduce the accuracy
of state-of-the-art WF attacks to less than 50%. Notably, WTF-PAD
and Walkie-Talkie offer both effective protection and reasonable
overheads, such that they are realistic for adoption in Tor. With
our larger dataset, we conduct an evaluation on SDAE, DF, AWF
and prior attacks against these defenses, as well as BuFLO and
Tamaraw.
Table 3 shows the overheads of each defense and the accuracy
of the attacks against defended datasets. BuFLO and Tamaraw,
the two high-overhead defenses, hold up well with less than 17%
accuracy. The attacks also manage at most 49.70% accuracy against
Walkie-Talkie due to symmetric collisions. A surprising result is
that DF achieves over 90% accuracy against WTF-PAD. Our tests
of WTF-PAD showed 64% overhead, which means that there was
more padding on average than in the Juarez et al.’s study [20], and
yet the attack was successful. More generally, it seems that the
larger amount of traces per site compared to the original WTF-
PAD evaluation has played a role in the higher accuracy attained
by the attack. For example, k-FP achieved nearly 69% accuracy in
our experiment, whereas Hayes and Danezis tested k-FP against
their own implementation of adaptive padding and obtained 30%
accuracy [14].
DF significantly outperforms AWF on the dataset protected by
WTF-PAD, with a much larger gap in performance than observed
on the undefended dataset. We believe that the deeper network
is able to better extract useful features in the WTF-PAD data that
the AWF model is unable to find, leading to this result. The model
architecture in DF plays a key role in its flexibility to generalize to
defended traffic.
We note that the overheads for BuFLO and Tamaraw are higher
than reported in prior work at 246% and 328% bandwidth overheads,
respectively. Furthermore, we found that the larger the dataset, the
greater the packet timing variance is, which is fundamental to
determine the padding rate. Also, Tamaraw has higher overheads
than BuFLO, which contradicts the purposed intended with its
design and the overheads reported in previous evaluations. The
cause of this is a greater amount of padding after the transmission
has finished in Tamaraw compared to BuFLO. BuFLO stops padding
immediately after the transmission has finished, as long as the
transmission has lasted for longer than ten seconds, which is the
case for most of the traces in our dataset.
With such heavy overheads, BuFLO and Tamaraw are not practi-
cal to deploy as a WF defense in Tor. WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie
have lower overheads, and Tor Project developers have already
shown an interest in deploying adaptive padding as a possible de-
fense [29, 30]. We thus select WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie for our
open-world evaluation.
5.7 Open-world Evaluation
We now evaluate the performance of the attack in the more realistic
open-world setting. As mentioned in Section 2, in the open-world
scenario, the adversary not only classifies traffic traces based on a
limited set of monitored sites, but he must also distinguish whether
the trace comes from a monitored site or an unmonitored one.
In our evaluation, we assess the performance of classifiers in
the open-world scenario on each model by showing true positive
rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR), but also with precision and
recall curves, recommended in the WF literature [20, 27] as more
appropriate metrics for the open-world evaluation than TPR and
FPR. The size of the monitored and unmonitored sets are heavily
unbalanced, so using only TPR and FPR can lead to incorrect inter-
pretation due to the base-rate fallacy. We also provide ROC curves
in Appendix C.
Standard Model. In previous studies on WF in the open-world set-
ting [14, 27, 38], it has been assumed that if the attacker included
unmonitored traces when training the classifier, it could help the
classifier better distinguish between monitored and unmonitored
traces. This assumption is also common in machine learning, and
we thus call it the Standard model. Fundamentally, the process of
training and creating datasets used during open-world evaluation
is the same as in the closed-world scenario, except that we addi-
tionally train on unmonitored websites traces as another class. To
investigate the impact of more training data on the performance
of the classifiers in the open-world scenario, we train the classifier
with different portions of the unmonitored dataset.
In our open-world evaluation, we use the prediction probability
to classify the input traces. In particular, if the input trace is a mon-
itored website trace and the maximum output probability belongs
to any monitored site and is greater than a threshold, we consider
this as a true positive. We used different thresholds for different WF
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Figure 6: Open World: The impact of the amount of unmonitored training data on TPR and FPR (Non-defended dataset).
attacks. We selected the thresholds for each WF attack such that
they have high TPR and low FPR. Figure 9 in Appendix C shows
examples of ROC curves for WF attacks against Non-defended,
WTF-PAD, and W-T datasets. Following the experimental proce-
dures of Rimmer et al. [31] and Panchenko et al. [27], we focus
on the binary results of whether the input trace is classified as
monitored (predicted to be in any of the monitored classes) or un-
monitored. Note that if the trace is determined to be monitored, the
attacker can then use the multi-class classification to predict which
website the user has actually visited.
k-NN and k-FP attacks use the k-nearest neighbors algorithm in
their predictions and do not output the probability of predictions.
For these attacks, we consider the prediction probability of a site as
the fraction of the nearest neighbors belonging to that site among
the k nearest neighbors. We explored the performance of these
attacks as the value of k varies from 2 to 10. We found that above
k = 5, the TPR and FPR do not change significantly. For our open-
world evaluation, we used k = 6 in both k-NN and k-FP.
5.7.1 Results. We first evaluate efficacy of our WF attack in the
Standard model as amounts of unmonitored training data varies
and compare it with other state-of-the-art WF attacks on the non-
defended traces. Our training set in this experiment contains 85,500
monitored traces (900 instances for each of 95 monitored sites) and
we varied the number of unmonitored sites from 900 to 20,000 sites
(one instance for each). Our testing set includes 9500 monitored
traces (100 instances for 95monitored sites) and 20,000 unmonitored
traces (one instance for 20,000 unmonitored sites). Note that the
20,000 unmonitored sites in the testing are different from those in
the training.
As shown in Figures 6a and 6b, the TPR tends to slightly decrease
with the reduction of FPR as the size of unmonitored training data
increase for all the WF attacks. The results show that the DF model
consistently performs best on both TPR and FPR, with 0.957 TPR
and 0.007 FPR for 20,000 unmonitored training sites. k-NN has the
lowest TPR and k-FP has the highest FPR. The DF, CUMUL and
AWF have the same FPR trend as the training size increases, but DF
has higher TPR than CUMUL and AWF over all the training sizes.
Our results show that as we increase the size of the unmonitored
class in the training, the FPR drops and it reaches its lowest amount
at size 20,000. In the next experiment, we fix the number of training
samples for the unmonitored class to 20,000 and we evaluate the
diagnostic ability of WF attacks as the discrimination threshold is
varied.We next perform the experiment on our non-defended,WTF-
PAD and Walkie-Talkie (W-T) datasets. As mentioned in Section 4,
for W-T, we cannot use the same dataset to W-T traces as it required
to be directly captured from half-duplex connections from Tor
browser. Our training set for the W-T evaluation contains 91,000
monitored traces (910 instances for each of 100 monitored sites) and
we varied the number of unmonitored sites from 900 to 20,000 sites
(one instance for each). Our testing set includes 9,000 traces (90
instances for each of 100 monitored sites) and 20,000 unmonitored
traces (one instance for 20,000 unmonitored sites). In the following
open-world experiments, we mainly focus on the precision and
recall to avoid the base-rate fallacy as mentioned above.
Figure 7 shows the precision-recall curves for WF attacks in our
non-defended, WTF-PAD and W-T datasets. Precision-recall curves
are used to represent the performance of the classifier as an alter-
native to ROC curves in imbalanced datasets. Imbalanced datasets
have an impact on precision, an important metric to measure per-
formance, however, ROC curves do not take precision into account.
This choice is specially relevant in the open-world evaluation, as the
size of the monitored set is typically orders of magnitude smaller
than the unmonitored set and as such it should be represented in
our testing set, thus leading to an imbalance [20].
As we see in the figure, the DF attack outperforms the other
state-of-the-art WF attacks in all three cases. In the non-defended
dataset, it is highly effective for any threshold. The CUMUL and
AWF attacks in Figure 7a have high precision but a very wide range
of recall, which means the attacks miss many monitored visits.
For traffic defended by WTF-PAD, Figure 7b shows a reduction
of both precision and recall for all WF attacks. The DF attacker
does the best. Tuned for high precision, it achieves precision of 0.96
and recall of 0.68. Tuned for high recall, it reaches 0.67 precision
and 0.96 recall. All the other WF attacks get close to the baseline
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Figure 7: Open World: Precision-Recall curves.
(random guessing) as the threshold decreases. The result shows
that the otherwise robust WTF-PAD is significantly undermined
by the DF attack.
Figure 7c shows the precision-recall curves for the W-T dataset.
The attacks all perform quite poorly, with all except the DF attack
close to the baseline. The DF attack does moderately better but still
has a precision of less than 0.36 in all cases.
5.8 A Deeper Look at W-T
Top-N prediction for closed-world W-T Wang and Goldberg ex-
plain that any attack using the main features of the state-of-the-art
attacks can get at most 50% accuracy against W-T [41]. In our
closed-world results, the DF attack nearly reached this theoretical
maximum. We now examine prediction probability for DF against
W-T. We consider top-N prediction, in which we look at not only
the highest probability (Top-1 prediction), but also the top N prob-
ability values. Surprisingly, we only need to look at the case of
N = 2. Top-2 prediction accuracy reaches 98.44% accuracy. This
likely means that DF is correctly selecting the real site and the
decoy site and, as expected, having to guess randomly between
them. We discuss the importance of this result in Section 6.
Asymmetric Collision (Closed-World) W-T requires that the client
create symmetric collisions between pairs of websites (site A is
molded with site B and vice versa). Since this requires storing all
the pairs, a simpler implementation would ignore this requirement
and have the client random select the decoy site for each access,
resulting in asymmetric collisions. In this setting, the DF attack
is much more accurate at 87.2%, compared to 49.7% with symmet-
ric collisions. This shows the importance of creating symmetric
collisions in W-T.
Asymmetric Collision (Open-World) We next evaluate the scenario
that 10% of the users do not follow the W-T guidelines, in that
they visit a non-sensitive site and choose a non-sensitive site as a
decoy instead of a sensitive one, and when they visit a sensitive site
they choose a sensitive site as a decoy instead of a non-sensitive
one. In this scenario, TPR is increased to 0.85 TPR, and FPR is
significantly reduced to 0.23 TPR, compared to the case that all
users strictly follow the procedure to create symmetric collisions
which has 0.80 TPR and 0.76 FPR. Thus, the major goal of W-T to
create the confusion between sensitive websites and non-sensitive
websites could be undermined in some scenarios.
6 DISCUSSION
The results of our study show that deep learning, and the DF ap-
proach in particular, is a powerful tool for WF attacks against Tor.
Further, our results against defended traffic show that WTF-PAD is
potentially vulnerable against deep-learning-based WF, with high
precision even in the open-world setting. Based on what we have
observed during experimental evaluations, we now discuss several
new directions in both improving the attacks and exploring designs
for more effective defenses.
Improving Open-World Classification. In our study, we observed
that designing the CNN architecture and tuning hyperarameters are
specific to both the environment and input data. For example, the
gap in performance between DF and AWF was much larger for the
open-world setting than the closed world. Additional exploration of
models in the open-world scenario, such as the depth and number
of convolutional layers, different filter sizes, or different dropout pa-
rameters, may yield improved results beyond what we have found
so far. More training data may also help the classifier better distin-
guish between monitored and unmonitored pages. Our simple data
format might be extended to include, for example, statistical timing
information that is currently excluded.
Finally, we note that the attacker can perform a targeted attack
on users in a semi-open-world setting, in which the targeted users
can be profiled as likely going to a subset of sites. For example, if the
user is known to only read one or two languages, then many sites
in other languages can be eliminated from the set. Alternatively,
a user’s profile can help the attacker identify some likely sites
for her interests, such that the classification of statistically similar
monitored sites may be dismissed as likely false positives.
Attack Costs. The time and effort needed to collect and train on
large data sets can have practical implications for weaker attack-
ers. Collecting large data sets as used in our experiments requires
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multiple PCs running for several days. Both Juarez et al. [19] and
Wang and Goldberg [40] show that after 10-14 days, the accuracy
of WF attacks goes down significantly. A weak attacker might need
to choose between limiting the scope of monitored sites, living
with the results of using stale and inaccurate data, or using fewer
training samples per site. We note that, even though deep learning
works best with more data, DF performs well in the closed-world
setting even with smaller datasets. Additionally, we found that
while k-FP, AWF, and DF can be trained quickly on large datasets,
k-NN and CUMUL do not scale well to larger data. In particular,
due to hyperparameters grid search, CUMUL took us days to train.
Further exploring the trade-offs between scalability and accuracy
remain important areas for future research.
WTF-PAD. As DF can break WTF-PAD with over 90% accuracy in
the closed-world setting, we now consider why the defense failed by
examining the adaptive padding algorithm at the heart ofWTF-PAD.
Adaptive padding aims to detect large timing gaps between bursts
and use padding to make these gaps less distinctive. While Juarez et
al. showed that this is effective against priorWF attacks [20], DF can
still detect patterns that remain after WTF-PAD is applied. When
used in analyzing images, CNN can detect an object (e.g. a dog)
anywhere in an image due to its use of convolutional layers with
multiple filters. Similarly, DF can detect any small region or portion
of distinguishing patterns, no matter where those patterns are
located in the trace. Adaptive padding only randomly disrupts some
patterns in the trace, leaving other patterns relatively unperturbed.
Walkie-Talkie. Walkie-Talkie (W-T) has an advantage over WTF-
PAD, as it focuses directly on features used in WF attacks, and it
seeks explicitly to create collisions. Indeed, W-T performed much
better than WTF-PAD against DF, which would seem to make it a
strong candidate for Tor. We note, however, that there are several
downsides to deploying W-T that require further investigation to
overcome:
• It requires the directory server to collect and distribute to
all clients a database of website patterns that can be used
to set the padding patterns. The patterns need to be kept
up to date to provide effective plausible deniability.
• Half-duplex communication adds to the latency of fetching
a site, 31% according to Wang and Goldberg [41], which is
a direct cost to end-user performance in a system that is
already slower than regular browsing.
• According to Wang and Goldberg, the browser is expected
to pair sensitive and non-sensitive pages and, ideally, pay
attention to issues such as language to select realistic cover
pages. To be most effective, then, the browser has to have a
lot of context about the user and the nature of her activity,
which is hard to build into the system.
• Given that DF achieves very high Top-2 accuracy, the at-
tacker can use auxiliary information such as language to
guess the real site. Further, if the system does not assign
a decoy site to a particular sensitive site or page (e.g. be-
yond the homepage of the site), then that site is effectively
uncovered, because it will not be used as a decoy for any
non-sensitive sites.
Alternative Defenses. To improve effectiveness against DF without
requiring extensive interaction with the browser, defenses could
apply adversarial machine learning [9, 13] to generate the adversar-
ial website traces to confuse the classifier. This is challenging to
do compared to adversarial machine learning in image processing
tasks, since the web trace is happening live, where the Tor client
does not know the full picture of the trace in advance. Further, Tor
is limited in how it can manipulate the trace—it can add dummy
packets and delay packets but not delete packets or speed them up.
Addressing these challenges would be interesting for future work.
7 CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigated the performance of WF using deep
learning techniques in both the closed-world scenario and the more
realistic open-world scenario. We proposed aWF attack called Deep
Fingerprinting (DF) using a sophisticate design based on a CNN
for extracting features and classification. Our closed-world results
show that the DF attack outperforms other state-of-the-art WF
attacks, including better than 90% accuracy on traffic defended by
WTF-PAD. We also performed open-world experiments, including
the first open-world evaluation of WF attacks using deep learning
against defended traffic. On undefended traffic, the DF attack attains
a 0.99 precision and a 0.94 recall, while against WTF-PAD, it reaches
a 0.96 precision and a 0.68 recall. Finally, we provided a discussion
on our results along with suggestions for further investigation.
Overall, our study reveals the need to improveWF defenses to be
more robust against attacks using deep learning, as attacks only get
better, and we have already identified several directions to improve
the DF attack further.
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A DEEP FINGERPRINTING (DF) MODEL’S
ARCHITECTURE FORWF ATTACKS
One of the compelling properties for CNN is the transferability of
the model. The transferability refers to the ability of the model to
be used as a base model for similar tasks. Instead of training an
entire CNN from scratch, the researcher can adapt the model to a
similar task, specifically with a similar input format.
In WF research, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first
who provide the full technical details, guidelines and suggestions
on how to implement our CNN-based DF model to perform WF
attacks. In this section we provide details for our DF architecture
and its hyperparameters to create our model, and to allow other
researchers to apply it in their future work (see Figure 8):
Input Data. The input data for our DFmodel is the vector of packets’
directions with length 5,000 (1 x 5,000). We initially tried adjusting
the input dimension to be a matrix of shape similar to the matrices
typically fed into CNNs for image recognition tasks (e.g., 50 x 100
pixels). The accuracy for 2D input was reasonably good, but slightly
lower than 1D input. The major difference is training time: 1D input
is significantly faster than 2D input, even though the total number
of data points is the same for both input dimensions. We presume
this difference results from tensor operations that have to deal with
higher dimensions of data. We suggest that for the WF task, it is
more appropriate to use 1D input as it is faster for training and
provides better classification performance
Convolutional Layers (Block 1). Figure 8 describes the architecture
of our DF model divided by blocks, where a block comprises a set
of convolutional layers, a batch normalization layer, a max pooling
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Input Data
Block 1
Convolutional 1D
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
32 Maps, Kernel: 1 x 8
ELU (alpha = 1.0)
Convolutional 1D
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
32 Maps, Kernel: 1 x 8
ELU (alpha = 1.0)
Max Pooling Pool: 1 x 8
Block 2
Convolutional 1D
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
64 Maps, Kernel: 1 x 8
ReLU
Convolutional 1D
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
64 Maps, Kernel: 1 x 8
ReLU
Max Pooling Pool: 1 x 8
Dropout Rate = 0.1
Dropout Rate = 0.1
Block 3
Convolutional 1D
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
128 Maps, Kernel: 1 x 8
ReLU
Convolutional 1D
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
128 Maps, Kernel: 1 x 8
ReLU
Max Pooling Pool: 1 x 8
Dropout Rate = 0.1
Block 4
Convolutional 1D
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
256 Maps, Kernel: 1 x 8
ReLU
Convolutional 1D
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
256 Maps, Kernel: 1 x 8
ReLU
Max Pooling Pool: 1 x 8
Dropout Rate = 0.1
Fully-Connected (FC) 
Layers
FC Layer 1
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
512 hidden units
ReLU
Dropout Rate = 0.7
FC Layer 2
Batch Normalization
Activation Layer
512 hidden units
ReLU
Dropout Rate = 0.5
FC Layer
Activation Layer
N hidden units
Softmax
Output Prediction
Figure 8: Our design of DF model’s architecture used in WF
attacks
layer and a dropout layer. The first block in the DF is specially
important due to its proximity to the input.
As we mentioned in Section 5, since the nature of our input
is different to inputs considered in image recognition, we had to
find an activation function that fits our input values. We chose the
Exponential Linear Unit (ELU) because prior work has shown that
it provides fast and accurate classification with negative inputs [11,
25]. The results obtained from hyperparameters tuning suggested
that applying ELU in the first two convolutional layers followed
by ReLU with the rest of convolutional layers provides the best
accuracy compared to only using ReLU. This suggests that ELU
plays an important role in extracting hidden features from the input
data.
Dropout Regularization. CNN-based models are specially vulnera-
ble to overfitting, an issue that might be easily overlooked by the
developer. We applied a dropout technique to mitigate overfitting
in the design of our DF model. Our strategy to apply dropout was to
embed in between feature extraction (Blocks 1-4) and classification
(Fully-connected layers) using different rates. In feature extraction,
we deployed dropout right after the max pooling layer in each block
with 0.1 dropout rate. In addition, we added a dropout layer after
each fully-connected layer with rate 0.7 and 0.5, respectively. As we
observed from the hyperparameters tuning, the overfitting mostly
arises at the fully-connected layers, and it is less problematic at
the convolutional layers. Thus, we adjusted different dropout rates
appropriately according to this observation.
Batch Normalization. We studied the technique to accelerate model
learning called Batch Normalization (BN) [18]. This technique pro-
vides benefits to improve the classification performance in order to,
for instance, learn faster while maintaining or even increasing ac-
curacy. Moreover, it also partially serves as a regulation method as
well. Thus, we applied BN and dropout regularization together and
obtained a boost in both performance and generalization. However,
adding BN layers requires additional training time. We observed
that it added around 100% training time for each epoch compared to
the model that did not apply BN. Yet, we believe it is worth applying
BN, as the additional training time is compensated with a faster
learning rate (it requires less number of epochs to reach the same
level of accuracy) and can ultimately achieve higher testing accu-
racy. In our model, we applied BN right after every convolutional
and fully-connected layers.
In conclusion, the researcher can apply this model and our sug-
gestions to develop their own CNN-based model for WF. There
are other details that we cannot describe here due to limit space
including number of filters, kernel size, stride size and pool size.
However, we will ensure that our implementation details, along
with the source code and data used in this study, will be published
on a website upon publication of this paper, so that researchers can
reproduce our results.
B ATTACK PERFORMANCE METRICS
In this section, we define and justify the metrics we have used to
evaluate the success of the attacks. There are two scenarios under
which WF attacks are evaluated: closed-world and open-world.
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B.1 Closed-world Evaluation
In the closed-world scenario, we assume that the user is limited
to visiting a fixed set of websites, and the attacker knows this set
and can train his classifier on it. In this scenario, the success of the
attacker is simply measured as the ratio of the number of correctly
classified traces to the total number of traces, we call this ratio the
attack’s accuracy.
Accuracy =
Pcorrect
N
(1)
Pcorrect is the total number of correct predictions. A correct
prediction is defined as the output of the classifier matching the
label of the website to which the test trace belongs. N is the total
number of instances in the test set.
B.2 Open-world Evaluation
In the open-world scenario, the user may visit any of a large number
of websites. Since the attacker cannot effectively train on so many
sites, he selects a relatively small set to train his classifier on (the
monitored set). For experimentation, we model the rest of the Web
using a set of sites that the attacker does not try to identify with
WF (the unmonitored set). Note that the unmonitored set is more
than two orders of magnitude larger than the monitored set in our
experiments. As mentioned in Section 5.7, we measure Precision
and Recall in this scenario.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(2)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(3)
Where:
• TP is the total number of test samples of monitored websites
that are correctly classified as monitored websites.
• TN is the total number of test samples of unmonitored web-
sites that are correctly classified as unmonitored websites.
• FP is the total number of test samples of unmonitored web-
sites that are misclassified as monitored websites.
• FN is the total number of monitored websites that are mis-
classified as unmonitored websites.
In addition, the attacker can measure precision and recall to tune
the system. If his primary goal is to reliably determine that a user
has visited a particular monitored website, one can try to decrease
false positives at the cost of true positives and thus increase the
precision of the attack. On the other hand, if the attacker aims to
cast a wide net and identify potential visitors to the monitored web
sites, then recall is more important, and the adversary should tune
the system to increase true positives at the cost of additional false
positives.
C OPEN-WORLD ROC CURVE
We plot the ROC curve for all the WF attacks against non-defended,
WTF-PAD and W-T datasets using the standard model in the open-
world scenario as shown in Figures 9a−9c. The ROC curve allows
us to evaluate the classifier and strive for a trade-off between TPR
and FPR. For example, the best overall results for DF against non-
defended traffic might be optimizing for high TPR, with 0.98 TPR
and 0.03 FPR, and optimizing for low FPR, with 0.94 TPR and 0.004
FPR.
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Figure 9: ROC curve in Open-world scenario
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